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Abstract
In this paper we consider the normal modal logics of elementary classes defined by first-order
formulas of the form ∀x0∃x1 . . .∃xn∧xiRλxj . We prove that many properties of these logics, such
as finite axiomatisability, elementarity, axiomatisability by a set of canonical formulas or by a single
generalised Sahlqvist formula, together with modal definability of the initial formula, either simulta-
neously hold or simultaneously do not hold.
1 Introduction
This research was motivated by the following observation. Consider two first-order conditions: ∀x∃y(xRy∧
yRx) and ∀x∃y(xRy ∧ yRy) (see Figure 1). The first one is modally definable by a Sahlqvist formula
p → 33p while the second is not, since it does not reflect ultrafilter extensions (e.g., [3], p. 142). The
difference between these two formulas becomes even more palpable if we look at the modal logics L1 and
L2 of the corresponding elementary classes. While L1 is axiomatisable (with the standard rules of Substi-
tution, Modus Ponens and Necessitation) by a single Sahlqvist formula, L2 is not finitely axiomatisable
and the class of Kripke frames {F | F |= L2} is not definable by any formula of first-order logic [16].
Moreover, any axiomatisation of L2 requires infinitely many non-canonical formulas [15]. On the other
hand, both formulas have a common structure and can be represented by graphs as in Figure 1, which are
called diagrams in this paper. The author decided that this issue is worthy of additional explanation. So
a study with the purpose of classifying all elementary classes C definable by formulas of the form ∀x0e(x0)
where e(x0) = ∃x1 . . . ∃xn
∧
xiRλxj according to the following model-theoretic properties (whose precise
definitions will be given in Section 2) was undertaken:
(I-i) e(x0) is modally definable by a generalised Sahlqvist formula;
(I-ii) e(x0) is locally modally definable;
(I-iii) ∀x0e(x0) is globally modally definable;
(I-iv) Log(C) is axiomatisable by a generalised Sahlqvist formula;
(I-v) Log(C) is finitely axiomatisable;
(I-vi) Log(C) is axiomatisable by a set of modal formulas containing finitely many propositional variables;
(I-vii) Log(C) is axiomatisable by a set of canonical formulas;
(I-viii) Log(C) is axiomatisable by a modal formula φ and a set of canonical formulas;
(I-ix) {F | F |= Log(C)} = C;
(I-x) {F | F |= Log(C)} is elementary1.
1In this paper we call a class of first-order models elementary if it is defined by a single first-order sentence, and
∆-elementary if it is defined by a set of sentences.
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Figure 1: Formulas and their diagrams (universally quantified variables are black, existentially quantified
variables are white)
Briefly, we prove that for any class C in question, conditions (I-i) – (I-x) either simultaneously hold,
or simultaneously do not hold, and this is determined by the existence in the corresponding diagram
of an undirected cycle not passing through the universally quantified point, provided that the diagram
is “minimal”, i.e., none of its edges may be removed without affecting the corresponding formula, and
“rooted”, i.e., each of its points is reachable from x0 via a directed path.
We exclude from our list such algorithmical properties as decidability, finite model property and
complexity, and do not deal with them in this paper, since an easy (but seemingly unpublished) argument
shows that all logics in our class have f.m.p. and are PSPACE-complete regardless of the mentioned cycle.
But we cannot help mentioning that the dichotomies in the complexity-theoretic setting have recently
become known to the logical community. For example, in [13] the modal logics given by universal Horn
sentences are classified into those that are in NP and those that are PSPACE-hard and this classification
was further refined in [27]. The authors of [25] classified universal relational constraints with respect to
the complexity of reasoning in the description logic EL.
This work is in line with current research in theoretical modal logic. First, this result can be considered
as a straighforward generalisation of Hughes’ paper [16] about the reflexive-successor logic. The axiomat-
ics of [16] was generalised in [1] to the case of first-order conditions of the form ∀x∃y(xRλy∧φ(y)) where
φ(y) is a generalised Kracht formula [18], and for some particular logics of this form finite axiomatisabil-
ity, the finite model property and elementarity are studied there. The authors of [1] also conjectured that
within their class there is a coincidence between finite axiomatisability and elementarity, and between
∆-elementarity and elementarity (cf. [2]).
Another central problem of modal logic is: given an elementary class, i.e., a first-order formula,
provide an explicit axiomatisation of the corresponding modal logic (this was done in [14]), and describe
its properties, for example, in terms of (I-i)–(I-x) (cf. problems 6.6 and 6.8 ibid.) Since the product of
two elementary classes is elementary [9], the school of many dimensional modal logic deals mainly with
such problems (e.g., [23],[24], and [8] for older results). In general, the algorithmic problem ‘given a first-
order formula, decide whether each of (I-i)–(I-x) holds’ should be undecidable due to the undecidability
of first-order logic. E.g., for (I-iii) it is Chagrova’s theorem [7],[6], but it seems plausible that using the
method of [6] one can prove such undecidability results for all items. On the other hand, when we restrict
attention to a fragment of the first-order language with decidable implication, then we have chances to
obtain such algorithmic criteria (as, e.g. in [19]), and the present paper is a step in this direction.
One more fundamental problem of modal logic is to study which implications between (I-i)–(I-x) hold,
and which of these conditions are independent. A brief summary of known results is given in [14] (see
discussion after Problem 6.6), and we think that our result is interesting in this context.
This paper also concerns a phenomenon called “canonicity in the limit”, referring to the logics (or,
more generally, in terms of universal algebra, sets of equations that are true on some elementary class),
that are canonical, but cannot be axiomatized by canonical formulas, and, even more, any axiomatisation
of such logics requires infinitely many non-canonical axioms. Beside the aforementioned Hughes’ logic,
this issue includes the equational theories of representable relational [15] and cylindrical [4] algebras, and
the well-known McKinsey-Lemmon logic [11]. This issuee was elaborated further in [5]. It turns out that
all logics under consideration in the present paper excepting those which are generally Sahlqvist have
this property; thus, what was thought pathological for elementarily generated modal logics can now be
seen to be the norm.
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Figure 2:
And — last but not least — this paper can be regarded as a contribution to the question of whether
there are natural generalisations of the Sahlqvist-Kracht correspondence in the basic modal language,
besides [12], [28], [29], [18]. From our result it follows that the Kracht’s theorem [21], [22] cannot be
generalised further within the formulas of our class with any of (I-i)–(I-x) as its consequence.
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we take a diagram, all the cycles of which pass through
the root, and use the result from [20] stating that the corresponding first-order formula e(x0) is modally
definable by a generalised Sahlqvist formula, and so, by the generalised Sahlqvist theorem [12], (I-i) –
(I-x) hold. Then we have to take a diagram with a cycle not passing through the root, and show that
(I-i) – (I-x) do not hold. This can be done only if e(x0) is “minimal”, i.e., it does not contain atoms
which can be thrown away without changing e(x0) semantically. Indeed, the diagram in Figure 1 on the
right has a cycle not passing through the root, but it is modally definable, since it is equivalent to the
reflexivity condition. So we additionally assume that the diagram is minimal. This can be done without
any loss of generality, since we may take any formula of our class and remove superfluous edges until
the formula becomes minimal. Under this assumption we prove that (I-i) – (I-x) do not hold in Sections
4 – 8. For this purpose we need the axiomatisations of the corresponding modal logics, constructed in
Section 3. Then we construct ‘non-standard frames’ for our logic ensuring falsity of (I-i) – (I-x).
To understand the intuition underlying these non-standard frames and the problems arising in their
construction, let us turn to [20], where similar frames are used to prove that (I-ii) does not hold for any
diagram with a cycle of the given form. Roughly, we temporarily remove one of the edges of a diagram D
belonging to a cycle (dashed edge in D in Figure 2), then clone the rest of the diagram (more precisely,
all points except the root) ω times, preserving edges of the diagram inside each layer and between the
root and any layer, and insert the deleted arrow between corresponding points of different layers, from
layers with lesser numbers to layers with greater numbers. Denote this Kripke frame by F (Figure 2, in
the middle). One can show that F has a root r and satisfies F 6|= eD(r) and (F)u.e. |= eD(r), yielding the
negation of (I-ii). Now imagine that we want to generalise this construction to prove that (I-iii) does
not hold. In this case we need our construction to validate a stronger condition (F)u.e. |= ∀xeD(x), so
the construction must be modified accordingly. In many cases we can just ‘put on top’ of F a reflexive
point (Figure 2, on the right), but in general this approach does not work and a more subtle construction
is required. So in Lemma 4.1 we ‘saturate’ D by adding new points until it satisfies ∀xeD(x), and thus
construct a Kripke frame FD+ . Then we delete an edge of the cycle, obtaining F
D
− , and use F
D
+ and F
D
−
instead of D in the construction of F. Another component of these non-standard frames are probabilistic
graphs of I. Hodkinson and Y. Venema.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Modal Formulas and Logics
Fix a set of propositional variables PV = {p1, p2, . . . }, a set of nominals NV = {j1, j2, . . . }, and a set
of indices Λ. Propositional variables are also denoted by p, q, r, . . . and nominals (only in this section)
by i and j. Hybrid formulas are built from propositional variables and nominals using the constant ⊥,
the binary connective →, and unary connectives 3λ for λ ∈ Λ and ∃i for i ∈ NV . Other constructs are
defined as usual: in particular, 2λ is a shorthand for ¬3λ¬ and ∀i is a shorthand for ¬∃i¬. A Kripke
frame is a tuple F = (WF, (RFλ : λ ∈ Λ)) where WF is a set (the carrier) and the RFλ are binary relations
on WF; instead of (x, y) ∈ RFλ we often write xRFλy or F |= xRλy. We consider the components of F as
sets rather than the parts of the interpretation mapping, so occasionly their superscripts may be different
from F or just omitted. A map θ : PV → P(WF) is called a propositional valuation (for a frame F), and
a map τ : NV → WF is called a nominal valuation. A propositional valuation θ in a Kripke frame is
called k-generated, if there are at most k different propositional variables p, such that θ(p) 6= ∅. Given
a Kripke frame F and valuations θ and τ , we define the truth of hybrid formulas in a point x ∈ WF as
usual:
F, θ, τ, x |= p⇐⇒ x ∈ θ(p); F, θ, τ, x |= j ⇐⇒ x = τ(j); F, θ, τ, x |= ⊥ never ;
F, θ, τ, x |= 3λφ⇐⇒ ∃y ∈WF such that xRFλy and F, θ, τ, y |= φ;
F, θ, τ, x |= φ→ ψ ⇐⇒ either F, θ, τ, x 6|= φ or F, θ, τ, x |= ψ;
F, θ, τ, x |= ∃i φ⇐⇒ for some nominal valuation τ
′ such that
τ ′(j) = τ(j) for all j ∈ NV \ {i} we have F, θ, τ ′, x |= φ.
A modal formula is a hybrid formula without nominals and nominal quantifiers. The truth of a modal
formula φ at a point w ∈ WF of a Kripke frame F depends only on the propositional valuation θ and is
denoted by F, θ, w |= φ. A modal formula φ is said to be valid in a point w ∈ WF of a Kripke frame
F (denoted by F, w |= φ) if for all valuations θ we have F, θ, w |= φ, and is said to be valid in a Kripke
frame F (denoted F |= φ) if for all w ∈WF we have F, w |= φ.
We can regard Kripke frames as models for the classical first-order language LfΛ, the signature of
which consists of binary predicate symbols Rλ for all λ ∈ Λ. We assume that LfΛ contains equality. The
formulas of this language are called in the sequel simply first-order formulas. Thus the truth relation
F |= a is also defined for closed first-order formulas a, also called first-order sentences. A first-order
sentence a is said to be globally modally definable if there exists a modal formula φ such that for any
Kripke frame F, F |= φ iff F |= a. A first-order formula a(x) with a single free variable x is said to be
locally modally definable if for any Kripke frame F and any point w in F, F, w |= φ iff F |= a(w) for some
modal formula φ.
Each first-order sentence a defines the class of Kripke frames Mod(a) = {F | F |= a}. A class of Kripke
frames C is said to be elementary if it is of this form, and ∆-elementary if C = ⋂∞k=1 Mod(ak) for some
sequence of first-order formulas {ak}. Given a class of Kripke frames C, by Log(C) we denote the set of
all modal formulas valid in all frames of C. A normal modal logic is a set of modal formulas containing
all propositional tautologies, the formulas
Kλ : 2λ(p→ q)→ (2λp→ 2λq), λ ∈ Λ,
and closed under inference rules Modus Ponens, Uniform Substitution and Necessitation:
φ, φ→ ψ
ψ
,
φ
φ[ψ/p]
,
φ
2λφ
.
It is easy to see that Log(C) is always a normal modal logic. A set of modal formulas Σ axiomatises a
normal modal logic L if L is the minimal (w.r.t. set-theoretic inclusion) normal modal logic containing Σ,
and in this case we write L = K+Σ. A modal logic is said to be finitely axiomatisable if it is axiomatised
by some finite Σ, and axiomatisable using finitely many variables if it is axiomatised by some Σ such that
only a finite number of propositional variables occur in Σ. A modal formula φ is said to be canonical if
it is valid in the canonical frame of the normal modal logic axiomatised by φ. For a set B we denote its
powerset by P(B).
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2.2 Minimal Diagrams and Kripke frames
Consider an arbitrary relational structure F = (WF, (RFλ : λ ∈ Λ)) where RFλ are binary relations on WF.
For a binary relation R by R˘ we denote its converse {(x, y) | (y, x) ∈ R}. A sequence z1λ1z2λ2 . . . λhzh+1
where for all i zi ∈ WF, λi ∈ Λ and (zi, zi+1) ∈ RFλi is called a directed path of length h connecting z1
to zh+1 in F. To obtain the definition of an undirected path, we put Λ
± = Λ ∪ {λ− | λ ∈ Λ}, assume
that RFλ− = R˘
F
λ and replace Λ with Λ
± in the definition of a directed path. An undirected cycle is an
undirected path of positive length h with z1 = zh+1 and not containing a subsequence of the form zλyλ
−z
and zλ−yλz. The distance from y ∈ WF and z ∈ WF in F (denoted by DistF(y, z)) is the length of the
shortest directed path connecting y to z in F; if such path does not exist, we put DistF(y, z) =∞.
In this paper we deal with pointed Kripke frames, in other words, with tuples of the form D =
(WD, (RDλ : λ ∈ Λ), xD0 ), where RDλ are binary relations on WD and xD0 ∈WD. A pointed Kripke frame
D is called rooted if for any point y of WD there exists a directed path leading from xD0 to y. A diagram
is a pointed rooted Kripke frame with a finite domain. An undirected cycle in a diagram D is said to be
inner if it does not contain the root xD0 .
Assume that WD = {x0, x1, . . . , xn} and that xD0 = x0. The symbols xi will play a double role: first,
they are the points of the diagram, second, they are first-order variables in the formulas defined below.
We set
kD(x0, x1, . . . , xn) =
∧
{xiRλxj | i, j ≤ n, xiRDλ xj}
and
eD(x0) = ∃x1 . . . ∃xnkD(x0, x1, . . . , xn).
We say that a diagram D′ = (WD
′
, (RD
′
λ : λ ∈ Λ), xD
′
0 ) is obtained from a diagram D = (W
D, (RDλ :
λ ∈ Λ), xD0 ) by deleting the edge xRλ0y and write D′ = D − (x, y, λ0) if (x, y) ∈ RDλ0 , WD
′
= WD,
xD
′
0 = x
D
0 , R
D′
λ0
= RDλ0 \ {(x, y)} and for all λ 6= λ0 RD
′
λ = R
D
λ . A diagram D is called globally (locally)
minimal if for any diagram D′ obtained from D by deleting an edge it is not true that `FOL ∀x0eD′(x0)→
∀x0eD(x0) (respectively, `FOL ∀x0(eD′(x0) → eD(x0))); FOL here means the classical first-order logic.
Global minimality implies local minimality, but the converse fails in general. For instance, the diagram
D corresponding to the formula eD(x0) = ∃x1∃x2(x0Rx1 ∧ x1Rx2) is locally but not globally minimal.
2.3 Ultrafilters, ultrafilter extension and ultraproducts
A set u ⊆ P(W ) is an ultrafilter over a set W if, for all X,Y ⊆W ,
(u1) if X,Y ∈ u, then X ∩ Y ∈ u;
(u2) if X ∈ u and X ⊂ Y , then Y ∈ u;
(u3) X /∈ u iff X¯ ∈ u, where X¯ denote the complement W \X.
From the definition it follows that for any ultrafilter u over a set W ∅ /∈ u and W ∈ u.
Given a frame F = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ)), its ultrafilter extension is defined as the frame Fu.e. =
(Wu.e., (Ru.e.λ : λ ∈ Λ)), whereWu.e. is the set of all ultrafilters overW , and uRu.e.λ u′ holds for ultrafilters u
and u′ iff R−1λ (X) ∈ u for all X ∈ u′, where R−1λ (X) = {z | zRλx for some x ∈ X}. Given a point a ∈W ,
the set pia = {X ⊆ W | a ∈ X} is obviously an ultrafilter; it is called the principal ultrafilter generated
by a.
Lemma 2.1 ([3], p. 95). For any points a, b in any frame F, aRλb ⇐⇒ piaRu.e.λ pib.
Lemma 2.2 ([3], p. 142). For any frame F and modal formula φ, Fu.e. |= φ implies F |= φ.
Lemma 2.3. Let u be an ultrafilter over W , W = W1 ∪ W2 ∪ · · · ∪ Wn, and Wi ∩ Wj = ∅ for all
1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. Then there exists a unique i such that Wi ∈ u.
Proof. Induction on n. The cases n = 1, n = 2 follow immediately from the definition of an ultrafilter.
Now suppose that the lemma is proven for some fixed n and let us prove that it is true for n + 1. Let
V1 = W1, . . . , Vn−1 = Wn−1, Vn = Wn ∪Wn+1. By inductive assumption we get either Wi ∈ u for some
1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, or Wn ∪Wn+1 ∈ u. In the last case, if Wn /∈ u and Wn+1 /∈ u, then by (u3) we have
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W1 ∪ · · · ∪Wn−1 ∪Wn+1 ∈ u and W1 ∪ · · · ∪Wn ∈ u, therefore, by (u2) W1 ∪ · · · ∪Wn−1 ∈ u. This
contradicts (u3) and Wn ∪Wn+1 ∈ u. Thus there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1 such that Wi ∈ u. If there are two
such i’s, then ∅ ∈ u.
We need yet another model-theoretic construction involving ultrafilters. Suppose that we have a
family of Kripke frames Fi = (W i, (Riλ : λ ∈ Λ)) for all i ∈ ω and a non-principal ultrafilter u over ω. We
say that two sequences α¯ = (α0, α1, α2, . . .) and β¯ = (β0, β1, β2, . . .), where αi, βi ∈ W i for all i ∈ ω are
u-equivalent (denoted by α¯ ∼u β¯), if {i | αi = βi} ∈ u. By W we denote the set of all such sequences.
The equivalence class of a sequence α we denote by dαe. The LfΛ-structure F = (W ′, (R′λ : λ ∈ Λ)),
where
W ′ = { all sequences of points from W}/ ∼u,
and dα¯eR′λdβ¯e ⇐⇒ {i | αiRiλβi} ∈ u is called an ultraproduct of Fi and is denoted by
∏u
i∈ω F
i.
Proposition 2.4 ([17], Thm 4.1.9). If C is an elementary class and {Fi} is a sequence of Kripke frames
from C, then for any ultrafilter u on ω, ∏ui∈ω Fi ∈ C.
2.4 Inverse limit of descriptive frames
A general frame is a triple (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) where (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ)) is a Kripke frame and P ⊆ P(W )
is non-empty and closed under intersection, complement and R−1λ . A general frame (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), P )
is said to be a descriptive frame if
1. If x, y ∈W are distinct, then there is some S ∈ P with x ∈ S and y /∈ S.
2. If x, y ∈W and ¬Rλ(x, y), then there is some S ∈ P with x ∈ R−1λ (S) and y /∈ S.
3.
⋂
µ 6= 0 for every µ ⊆ P with finite intersection property.
Below we denote general frames by calligraphic letters to distinguish between them and Kripke frames.
If F = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ)) is a Kripke frame, we write F+ for (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ),P(W )). Clearly, if F is
finite (i.e., W is finite), then F+ is a descriptive frame. If F = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) is a descriptive frame,
we write F+ for its underlying Kripke frame F = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ)). Let F = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) be
a general frame and φ a modal formula. We say that φ is valid in F , written F |= φ if (W, (Rλ : λ ∈
Λ), θ, w |= φ for every assigment θ : PV → P and every w ∈W .
An inverse family of descriptive frames is an object I = ((I,≤),Fi, (fij : i ≥ j in I)) where (I,≤)
is an upwards-directed partial order (’upwards-directed’ means that any finite subset of I has an upper
bound in I), Fi = (Wi, ((Ri)λ : λ ∈ Λ), Pi) is a descriptive frame for each i ∈ I, and for each i, j ∈ I
with i ≥ j fij : Fi → Fj is a frame homomorphism such that (a) fii is the identity map on Wi, and (b)
fjk ◦ fij = fik whenever k ≤ j ≤ i in I.
The inverse limit lim←I of I is defined to be F = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) where
W = {x ∈
∏
i∈I
Wi : fij(xi) = xj for each i ≥ j in I},
Rλ = {(x, y) ∈W : xi(Ri)λyi for each i ∈ I},
P is generated by {f−1i [S] : i ∈ I, S ∈ Pi},
where in the last line for each i ∈ I fi : W →Wi is the projection given by fi(x) = xi.
Proposition 2.5 ([10], 1.1.2(8), 1.11.4). The inverse limit F of I is itself a descriptive frame. Moreover,
for any modal formula φ, if φ is valid in Fi for each i, then φ is valid in F .
Ignoring the line defining P , we obtain the definition of an inverse limit lim←I of families of Kripke
frames and graphs. If I = (ω,≤) and fij are clear from context, we denote the system simply {Fi}, and
the inverse limit by lim←Fi.
We regard a general frame (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) as a first-order structure whose domain is the disjoint
union of W and P , with unary relations defining W and P and binary relations Rλ ⊆ W × W and
 ⊆W × P interpreted in the natural way. It is easy to write down a finite set ∆ of first-order sentences
expressing that a structure for this signature is a general frame.
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As is well known, every modal formula φ has a standard translation to a formula STx(φ) of first-
order logic with a free variable x. We modify this here by regarding propositional variables as first-order
variables. For a propositional variable p, we define STx(p) to be x  p. We put STx(>) = >, STx(φ ∧ ψ)
and similarly for negation, STx(2λφ) = ∀y(Rλ(x, y)→ STy(φ)) and STx(3λφ) = ∃y(Rλ(x, y)∧STy(φ)),
where y is a new variable. For a formula φ(p1, . . . , pn), we write ST (φ) for the universal closure ∀x ∈
W∀p1 . . . pn ∈ P STx(φ). For a set X of modal formulas we write ST (X) for {ST (φ) : φ ∈ X}. Clearly,
a modal formula φ is valid in a general frame G iff ST (φ) is true in it in first-order semantics:
G |= φ⇐⇒ G |= ST (φ). (I)
Hence, φ is valid in a Kripke frame F iff ST (φ) is true in F+ in first-order semantics:
F |= φ⇐⇒ F+ |= ST (φ). (II)
Lemma 2.6 (Lemma 4.2 from [11]). Let F = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) be a descriptive frame with countable
P , and φ be a canonical formula. Then F |= φ implies F+ |= φ.
The following lemma generalises the argument of (and is inspired by) Theorem 4.4 from [11], but
seemingly does not follow from that paper.
Lemma 2.7. Let γi be a sequence of modal formulas such that γi1 implies γi2 if i2 < i1. Suppose that
for all l there exists n such that for all k there exists an inverse system of finite Kripke frames {Fi} such
that:
(L1) for all i Fi |= γk,
(L2) lim←Fi |= γl,
(L3) lim←Fi 6|= γn.
Then any axiomatisation of L = K + {γn : n ∈ ω} has infinitely many non-canonical axioms.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that L is axiomatised by a single axiom B together with a set Σ of
canonical formulas. Since Σ ∪ {B} and {γk : k < ω} axiomatise the same logic, the two first-order
theories ∆ ∪ ST (Σ ∪ {B}) and ∆ ∪ {ST (γk) : k < ω} have the same models. Then by the first-order
compactness we conclude:
(a) there is l < ω such that ∆ ∪ ST (γl) |= ST (B),
since l is fixed, we fix n from the condition of lemma, then
(b) there is a finite subset X ⊆ Σ such that ∆ ∪ ST (X ∪ {B}) |= ST (γn)
(c) there is a finite k such that ∆ ∪ ST (γk) |= ST (X), without loss of generality, we may take k > l.
The condition of the lemma gives us an inverse system {Fi}. Let F = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), P ) =
lim←(F+i ). Clearly, F+ = lim←Fi. By Proposition 2.5, since all Fi |= γk, F |= γk. Plainly, F |= ∆. Now,
by (c) and (I) we obtain that F |= X. The formulas in X are assumed canonical, and P by construction
is countable, therefore by Lemma 2.6 F+ |= X as well. By (II), (F+)+ |= ST (X).
As F+ |= γl, (II) gives (F+)+ |= ST (γl). Clearly, (F+)+ |= ∆. So by (a), (F+)+ |= ST (B). Now we
have (F+)+ |= ∆ ∪ ST (X ∪ {B}), so by (b) and (II) we arrive at F+ |= γn, a contradition to (L3).
3 Axiomatisation
Fix a rooted diagram D. An axiomatisation of its normal modal logic LD = Log(∀x0eD(x0)) can be
obtained using the algorithm from [14]. It allows one to write modal axioms for any normal modal logic
generated by a first-order formula φ preserved under p-morphic images, disjoint unions and generated
submodels, and this is our case. This algorithm is followed quite liberally, since we act within a very
restricted class of formulas, and this allows us to keep the presentation simpler and closer to the ultimate
goal of this paper. We also give an independent and ‘handmade’ proof of the soundness and completeness
and invite connoisseurs to compare it with the general machinery from the quoted paper. They will
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definitely note that in terms of [14] the set Ψ below is nothing else but a display and γDΨ an approximant
for the hybrid formula ηD. We also note that our axioms and completeness proof are similar to those in
[30] for the “reflexive successor” logic.
We proceed in two stages: first, we construct a ‘hybrid equivalent’ of φ, second, we translate these
hybrid formulas into modal axioms. To translate eD(x0) into hybrid language, we need to construct a
spanning tree2 for D.
Definition 3.1. A tuple T = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), r) is called a tree with a root r if the following holds
1) r ∈W ,
2) R−1λ (r) = ∅ for all λ ∈ Λ, where R−1λ (x) = {z | (z, x) ∈ Rλ},
3) for all x ∈W \ {r} there is a unique directed path from r to x.
A tuple T = (WD, (RTλ : λ ∈ Λ), x0) is called a spanning tree for a diagram
D = (WD, (RDλ : λ ∈ Λ), x0), if T is a tree, and for all λ ∈ Λ, x, y ∈WD xRTλy implies xRDλ y.
Proposition 3.2 (e.g., Lemma 5.5 from [20]). For any rooted diagram D there exists a spanning tree T
for D.
Now, to every xi we assign a nominal ji and the hybrid formula
χDi = ji ∧
∧
xiRDλ xk
3λjk.
Then, working by induction on T, moving from leaves to the root, to any point xi of W
D we assign a
hybrid formula
ηDi = χ
D
i ∧
∧
xiRTλxk
3λη
D
k .
Put ηD = ηD0 . Now note that e
D(x0) is equivalent to ∃j1 . . . ∃jnηD in that sense that for any pointed
Kripke frame F and its point w we have F, w |= ηD iff F |= eD(w). By ηD(φ0, φ1, . . . , φn) we denote the
result of the substitution of modal formulas φl for nominals jl in the formula η
D for 0 ≤ l ≤ n. For a set
of formulas Ψ and a map κ : {0, 1, . . . , n} → Ψ let ηD(κ) = ηD(κ(0), κ(1), . . . , κ(n)). Then we set
γDΨ =
∨
κ:{0,1,...,n}→Ψ
ηD(κ),
where the disjunction is taken over all possible maps κ : {0, 1, . . . , n} → Ψ. Finally, let Ψh = {p¯ε | p¯ =
{p1, . . . , ph}, ε ∈ {0, 1}h}, where h < ω and p¯ε1...εh = pε11 ∧ · · · ∧ pεhh , p1 = p, p0 = ¬p.
Theorem 3.3. LD is axiomatised by the set of formulas {γDΨh | h ∈ ω}.
Proof. Soundness. Given a Kripke frame F = (WF, (RFλ : λ ∈ Λ)), we show that for any h ∈ ω and
w0 ∈ WF, F |= eD(w0) implies F,w0 |= γDΨh . Suppose that F |= eD(w0), hence there exist points
w1, . . . wn ∈ WF such that F |= kD(w0, w1, . . . , wn). Let θ be a valuation on F. For a fixed i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
let ε(i) be the boolean vector, the j-th component of which tells whether wi belongs to θ(pj), and let
κ(i) = p¯ε(i). It is easy to check that F, θ, w0 |= ηD(κ).
Completeness. Let F = (WF, (RFλ : λ ∈ Λ)) be the canonical frame for K + {γDΨh | h ∈ ω}, i.e., WF
is the set of all maximal (K + {γDΨh | h ∈ ω})-consistent sets (mcs) of formulas, and for any w,w′ ∈WF,
wRFλw
′ iff for all formulas φ ∈ w′ 3λφ ∈ w. We show that F |= ∀x0eD(x0), and it follows that the
logic K + {γDΨh | h ∈ ω} is Kripke complete with respect to the elementary class defined by this formula,
i.e.,∀x0eD(x0).
Take w0 ∈ WF. Let us prove that there exist w1, . . . , wn ∈ WF such that F |= kD(w0, . . . , wn). By
V we denote the set of word tuples ~v = (v0,v1, . . . ,vn), where vi ∈ {0, 1}∗. We set ~v ≺ ~u iff for every
0 ≤ i ≤ n vi is an initial segment of ui; thus (V,≺) is a transitive tree with branching 2n+1 in each node.
2Traditionally, spanning trees are defined for unoriented graphs and are unoriented. Here we use an oriented modification
of this notion, but we still call it a spanning tree.
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Suppose that ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, . . . is an enumeration of all modal formulas. For a word v ∈ {0, 1}∗, by vj we
denote the j-th symbol of v and we set
v# =
|v|∧
j=1
ψv
j
j ,
where for a modal formula ψ, ψ1 = ψ,ψ0 = ¬ψ. By ~v# we denote ηD(v#0 ,v#1 , . . . ,v#n ). We say that ~v
is good if F, θ, w0 |= ~v#, where θ is the canonical valuation.
Claim 1. If ~v ≺ ~u and ~u is good, then so is ~v. Indeed, if ~v ≺ ~u, then ~u# implies ~v#.
Claim 2. For each m there is a good ~v such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n |vi| = m. To prove this claim, it is
enough to notice that ∨
~v:|vi|=m
~v#
is a substitution instance of γDΨm .
By Ko¨nig’s lemma applied to (V,≺) there exists a tuple of infinite strings
v∞ = (v∞0 ,v
∞
1 , . . . ,v
∞
n ),
such that any tuple formed by the initial segments of its components is good. By setting wi = {ψj |
(v∞i )
j = 1} ∪ {¬ψj | (v∞i )j = 0} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the tuple ~v∞ gives rise to mcs’es w1, . . . , wn. It is clear
that w0 = {ψj |(v∞0 )j = 1} ∪ {¬ψj |(v∞0 )j = 0}.
Now, we take h, l and λ such that xhR
D
λ xl and prove that whR
F
λwl in the canonical model. Suppose
that for some i ψi ∈ wl but 3ψi /∈ wh. But 2λ¬ψi = ψk for some k. Take m = max(i, k), and by ~v denote
the word vector formed by the first m bits of components of ~v∞. Since ~v is good, we have w0 |= ~v#,
which contradicts the consistency of w0. Indeed, since xhR
D
λ xl, η
D contains jh ∧ 3jl as a subformula,
maybe preceded by diamonds and conjunctions, and thus ~v# is built from {ψ1, . . . , ψm} using ∧ and
diamonds and has a subformula 2λ¬ψi ∧3λψi.
Let d be the depth of the spanning tree T for D used in the construction of ηD. We will also use
formulas γDm = 2
≤d(p1∨· · ·∨pm)→ γD{p1,...,pm}, which are more convenient to work with hereafter. Since
γDΨh is equivalent to a substitution instance of γ
D
2h , we have
Corollary 3.4. LD is axiomatised by {γDm | m ∈ ω}.
Intuitively, γDm says that ‘if an d-neighborhood of a point w0 of F is coloured in m colours, then we
can paint T˜ in m colors such that the points of T˜ with equal labels have equal colours and there exists
a homomorphism from T˜ to F preserving the colouring and sending x0 to w0, where T˜ is a reduced
syntactical tree of ηD defined as follows.
Definition 3.5. Let φ be a formula built using only ∧, 3λ and nominals jk with 0 ≤ k ≤ n. A labelled
tree with a root r is a tuple T˜ = (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), r, f), where (W, (Rλ : λ ∈ Λ), r) is a tree with a root r
and f (a label function) is a map from W to P({x0, . . . , xn}). A reduced syntactical tree of a formula φ
is a labelled tree T˜φ = (Wφ, (Rφλ : λ ∈ Λ), rφ, fφ) defined by induction on the length of φ.
Case 1: φ = jk, where k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Then Wφ contains a single point y. The map fφ takes y to
{xk} and the relations Rφλ are empty.
Case 2: φ = χ ∧ ψ. Then put Wφ = (Wχ\{rχ}) ∪ (Wψ\{rψ}) ∪ {rφ}, where rφ is a new point. The
relations Rλ on W
χ and Wψ remain the same, and rφRλw iff w ∈ Wχ and rχRχλw or w ∈ Wψ and
rψRψλw. The map f
φ sends rφ to fχ(rχ) ∪ fψ(rψ) and is equal to fχ or fψ on all other points.
Case 3: φ = 3λψ. Then W
φ = Wψ ∪ {rφ}, where rφ is a new point. The Rµ for µ 6= λ we leave
untouched, and to Rλ we add an arrow, joining r
φ with rψ. We put f(rφ) = ∅, and do not change f in
all other points.
From the definition of T˜ and ηD it follows that the label function of T˜ maps the points of T˜ to
singletons, and so it can be understood as a homomorphism from T˜ to D. The labelled tree T˜ may be
also understood as a sort of unravelling of the initial diagram D.
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D
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x1
x2
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x2 x1
x0
x1
x2
T
Figure 3: A diagram D and its 1-unravelling T˜.
Example 3.6. Let D be as in the Figure 3 on the left. The spanning tree T is in the middle of the
Figure 3, and so η = j0 ∧3(j2 ∧3j1)∧3(j1 ∧3j2), the reduced syntactical tree of which is in the Figure
3 on the right. Thus the logic LD is axiomatized by the formulas
γDm = 2(p1 ∨ · · · ∨ pm)→
m∨
i,j=1
(3(pi ∧3pj) ∧3(pj ∧3pi)).
4 A property of globally minimal diagrams
Suppose that D and D′ are diagrams. A map f : WD → WD′ is called a monotone map from D to
D′, if for all x, y ∈ WD and λ ∈ Λ, xRDλ y implies f(x)RD
′
λ f(y). If also f(x
D
0 ) = x
D′
0 , then f is called a
homomorphism.
Lemma 4.1. For any globally minimal rooted diagram D with an inner cycle, there exist two pointed
finite Kripke frames FD+ = (W
D
± , ((R
D
+)λ : λ ∈ Λ), w0) and FD− = (WD± , ((RD−)λ : λ ∈ Λ), w0), points
xd, xd′ ∈WD, an index λd ∈ Λ, and an injective homomorphism g : D→ FD+ sending x0 to w0 such that:
(C-i) FD− = F
D
+ − (g(xd), g(x′d), λd);
(C-ii) FD− 6|= eD(w0);
(C-iii) FD+ |= eD(w0);
(C-iv) the points g(xd) and g(xd′) can be connected in F
D
− by an undirected path not passing through
w0, all points of which belong to the image of g;
(C-v) for any homomorphism h from D to FD+ we have
the image of h is {g(x0), . . . , g(xn)}, (III)
and for all 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n and λ ∈ Λ
h(xi)(R
D
+)λh(xj) implies xiR
D
λ xj ; (IV)
(C-vi) if w 6= w0, then FD− |= eD(w) for all w ∈WD± .
(C-iv) and (C-v) are technical conditions needed to prove that, for example, the pseudoproducts
constructed in Section 5 refute eD(x0) in their roots. In fact, (C-v) says that any homomorphism h from
D to FD+ is an isomorphism between D and the restriction of F
D
+ to the image of h, and it is easy to see
that (C-v) together with (C-i) always imply (C-ii). Indeed, suppose that FD− |= eD(w0). Hence, there is
a homomorphism h: D → FD− . But h is also a homomorphism from D to FD+ . Thus, by (C-v), h is an
isomorphism between D the restriction of FD+ to h(W
D). Therefore there must be points xi, xj ∈ D, such
that h(xi) = g(xd), h(xj) = g(xd′), and (xd, xd′) ∈ RDλd . Now we have a contradiction to the facts that
h is a homomorphism to FD− and (g(xd), g(xd′)) /∈ (RD−)λd .
10
x0
x1
x2
D
w0
w1
w2
FD±
w0
w1
w2
FD−
w0
w1
w2
FD+
w3w3
w3
Figure 4:
Example 4.2. Consider the diagram from Figure 4. It is easy to see that the frames FD+ and F
D
− from
this figure satisfy (C-i) – (C-vi), where d = 2, d′ = 1, and g(xi) = wi for i = 0, 1, 2. In particular, there
exist two homomorphisms from D to FD+ : the first coincides with g, the second swaps around x1 and x2,
and both of them satisfy (C-v). Since FD+ and F
D
− have a common base set W
D
± , one can think of F
D
+ and
FD− as a tuple F
D
± , consisting of the frame F
D
+ and a selected edge given by d, d
′ and λd.
In general, to satisfy conditions (C-i) – (C-v), we can always build a spanning tree for D, and take
F+ = D and F− = F+−(xd, xd′ , λd), where (xd, xd′ , λd) is one of the edges of the inner cycle not belonging
to the spanning tree. The main problem is condition (C-vi). In this example we got it at the price of
a reflexive point on top of D. But in some cases this may break the conditions (C-v) and (C-ii), as the
next example shows, so a more subtle construction is required.
Example 4.3. Consider the diagram D on the left hand side of Figure 5. It is minimal. But if we choose
the edge to delete (it could be done in a unique way without affecting connectivity; this edge is dashed
in the figure in the middle), add a reflexive point and connect all points except the root to this reflexive
point, then the obtained diagram (even after removing the selected arrow) will satisfy eD(x0) (see the
frame in the middle), and that is bad. But we can amend this situation by a more elaborate construction
as on the right hand side. Roughly, at first we iteratedly add new points by considering eD(x0) as a
tuple-generating rule, and only after that we close the construction with a reflexive point.
The proof of Lemma 4.1. Given a rooted diagram D = (WD, (RDλ : λ ∈ Λ), x0), we define a sequence of
tuples (FDi , A
D
i ) where F
D
i = (W
D
i , R
D
i,λ, x
D
i,0) is a Kripke frame and A
D
i ⊆ WDi . Intuitively, Ai denotes
the set of those points w in Fi which may falsify (C-vi) and so have to be “repaired”, which results
in Fi+1. Formally, we set F
D
1 = D and A
D
1 = W
D \ {x0}, xD1,0 = x0. Now given (FDi , ADi ), we define
(FDi+1, A
D
i+1) as follows. Let
WDi+1 = ((W
D
i \Ai)× {x0}) ∪ (Ai ×WD),
RDi+1,λ = {((a, x0), (b, x0)) | (a, b) ∈ RDi } ∪ {((a, b), (a, c)) | a ∈ Ai, b, c ∈WD and bRDλ c},
ADi+1 = A
D
i × (WD \ {x0}) and xDi+1,0 = xDi,0 × {x0}.
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Figure 5:
Let r be the maximal distance from x0 to any point xi of D. To obtain F
D
+ , we take F
D
r , add a new
all-λ-reflexive point ◦, and join all points y of Ar to ◦ by all Rλ. Now we set g(xi) = (xi, x0, . . . , x0)
and FD− = F
D
+ − (g(xd), g(xd′), λd), where (xd, xd′ , λd) is an arbitrary chosen edge of the inner cycle that
does not belong to some spanning tree for D. Denote ∆ = {g(x0), . . . , g(xn)} = WD×{x0}× . . .×{x0}.
Thus, g is a bijection between WD and ∆.
We claim that the conditions (C-i)–(C-vi) are satisfied. It is clear that the construction guarantees
the validity of conditions (C-i), (C-iii) and (C-vi). Condition (C-iv) is true since (xd, xd′ , λd) belongs to
the inner cycle.
Let us prove (C-v). Suppose that there exists a homomorphism h from D to FD+ . It is clear that
h(xi) 6= ◦ for all i, because r was chosen large enough and so the new reflexive point ◦ is too far from
w0. Let Γ = ∆ ∩ {h(x0), h(x1), . . . , h(xn)}. Suppose that ∆ \ Γ is not empty.
For xi ∈ WD let Rank(xi) denote the distance from x0 to xi in D. Let Del(xi) be the set of all
xj ∈ WD, xj 6= xi such that all paths from x0 to xj pass through xi. Informally speaking, if we delete
xi, then Del(xi) is the set of all points that cease to be visible from x0.
Now let xα be a point of W
D of maximal rank such that g(xα) ∈ ∆ \ Γ. Let D′ be obtained from D
by deleting xα together with all adjacent edges. The following claims show that D
′ is rooted and that
the image of h belongs to FD
′
r considered as a part of F
D
r .
Claim 1. Del(xα) = ∅. Otherwise, take a point xα′ of Del(xα). From the definition of Del(xα) and
FDr it follows that all paths in F
D
+ leading from g(x0) to g(xα′) pass through g(xα). Let us prove that
g(xα′) /∈ Γ. Suppose that g(xα′) ∈ Γ, that is g(xα′) = h(xα′′) for some α′′. Since D is rooted, there
exists a path in D from x0 to xα′′ . The image of this path under the map h is a path connecting g(x0) to
g(xα′) in F
D
+ . But this path must pass through g(xα). That contradicts g(xα) /∈ Γ. Hence, g(xα′) /∈ Γ.
But Rank(xα′) > Rank(xα). This contradicts the maximality of the rank of xα in ∆ \ Γ.
Claim 2. If h(xα) = (xi1 , . . . , xin), then xik 6= xα for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. First, consider the case when
h(xα) ∈ ∆. Then there is nothing to prove, because in this case ik = 0 for 2 ≤ k ≤ n, and i1 6= α since
g(xα) /∈ Γ. So, suppose that h(xα) /∈ ∆. This means that
|{k | xik 6= x0}| ≥ 2. (V)
Let us prove that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n we have Rank(xik) < Rank(xα). To this end, note that the distance
in FD+ satisfies
DistFD+ ((x0, . . . , x0), (xi1 , . . . , xin)) = DistD(x0, xi1) + . . .+ DistD(x0, xin).
Now, suppose that for some k we have Rank(xik) ≥ Rank(xα). Then taking into account (V) we obtain
that
DistFD+ (w0, h(xα)) = DistFD+ ((x0, . . . , x0), (xi1 , . . . , xin)) > Rank(xα),
a contradiction. Hence, Rank(xik) < Rank(xα) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n, and, in particular, xik 6= xα.
Claim 3. For any β ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if h(xβ) = (xi1 , . . . , xin), then xik 6= xα for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Indeed,
if Rank(xβ) ≤ Rank(xα), then a similar argument works. Now, suppose that Rank(xβ) > Rank(xα). Let
B ⊆WD be the set of all points of rank greater than Rank(xα). But as xα is supposed to be an element
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of ∆ \ Γ of maximal rank, from the definition of B it follows that h(B) ⊆ ∆, and, in particular, for all
k > 2 xik = x0 6= xα.
Now, let the diagram D′ be obtained from D by deleting xα together with all adjacent edges. Then
`FOL ∀x0eD′(x0) → ∀x0eFD
′
r (x0) and `FOL ∀x0eFD
′
r (x0) → ∀x0eD(x0). Thus `FOL ∀x0eD′(x0) →
∀x0eD(x0), and this contradicts the global minimality of D.
We have just proved (III) of (C-v). To prove (IV), take a homomorphism h from D to F+D. Via
identification the D with a copy of itself sitting inside F+D given by the image of g, we see that the
map h acts on the set Arr(D) = {(xi, xj , λ) | xi, xj ∈ WD, λ ∈ Λ, (xi, xj) ∈ RDλ }, sending (xi, xj , λ) to
(h(xi), h(xj), λ) which is also in Arr(D). From (III) it follows that h is injective on Arr(D). Therefore,
since Arr(D) is finite, h is surjective on Arr(D), and so satisfies (IV) of (C-v).
Another proof of (IV) of (C-v): take a homomorphism h fromD to F+D and assume that h(xi)(R
D
+)λh(xj)
holds while xiR
D
λ xj does not. It follows that the edge g
−1(h(xi))RDλ g
−1(h(xi)) (which is well defined
because of (III)) is superfluous in D.
Condition (C-ii) is a consequence of (C-v) and (C-i).
5 Pseudoproducts with graphs
By a graph we understand a tuple G = (V,E), where E is a symmetric binary relation on V . To emphasise
symmetricity of E, instead of (v1, v2) ∈ E we sometimes write {v1, v2} ∈ E. For a ordinal α ≤ ω an
α-colouring of a graph G is a map τ : V → α, such that every two adjacent vertices are mapped to
different elements of α. The elements of α in this context are called colours. In general, below we do not
suppose E to be irreflexive, thus G may contain edges of the form (v, v), which are called loops. However,
it is clear that any graph that contains loops does not have colourings at all, and so in Lemma 5.1, (C2)
we implicitly assume that G does not have loops.
We fix a minimal diagram D with an inner cycle. Let FD+ = (W
D
± , ((R
D
+)λ : λ ∈ Λ), w0) and FD− =
(WD± , ((R
D
−)λ : λ ∈ Λ), w0) together with d, d′, λd and g satisfy conditions (C-i) – (C-vi) of Lemma 4.1.
Let G = (V,E) be an arbitrary graph. By FD± × G denote3 the Kripke frame (WD,G, (RD,Gλ : λ ∈ Λ))
where WD,G = {w0} ∪ (WD± \ {w0})× V and
RD,Gλ = {(w0, w0) | FD− |= w0Rλw0; }∪
{(w0, (y, v)) | FD− |= w0Rλy; y ∈WD± \ {w0}; v ∈ V }∪
{((y, v), w0) | FD− |= yRλw0; y ∈WD± \ {w0}; v ∈ V }∪
{((x, v), (y, v)) | FD− |= xRλy;x, y ∈WD± \ {w0}; v ∈ V ; }∪
{((g(xd), v1), (g(xd′), v2)) | v1 ∈ V ; v2 ∈ V ; {v1, v2} ∈ E, λ = λd}.
An example of this construction forD and FD± from Example 4.2 is given in Figure 6. This construction
has a simpler description in terms of projection functions. If pr denotes the projection from FD± × G to
FD+ , given by formulas pr((x, v)) = x, pr(w0) = w0, and h denotes the projection from F
D
± × G to V ′,
where V ′ = V ∪ {⊥}, given by formulas h((x, v)) = v, h(w0) = ⊥, then the RD,Gλ satisfy the following
condition for all η, χ ∈WD,G: FD± ×G |= ηRλχ iff
FD− |= pr(η)Rλpr(χ) and (h(η) = h(χ) or ⊥ ∈ {h(η), h(χ)})
or
FD− 6|= pr(η)Rλpr(χ),FD+ |= pr(η)Rλpr(χ) and G |= h(η)Eh(χ).
Recall that LD is axiomatized by formulas γDn of Section 3 saying “if an d-neighborhood of a point
w0 of F is painted in m colours, then we can paint the tree T˜ = (W
T˜, (RT˜λ : λ ∈ Λ), x0) (defined in
Section 3) in m colors such that the points of T˜ with equal labels have equal colours and there exists a
homomorphism from T˜ to F sending x0 to w0 and preserving the colouring”. We understand f
T˜ as a
homomorphism from T˜ to D.
3We chose this notation for pseudoproducts because they somehow combine the features of FD+ and F
D
−. You may think
of FD± as a shorthand for a tuple (F
D
+,F
D
−) with intuition from Example 4.2.
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Figure 6: A pseudoproduct.
The next lemma shows the connection between the chromatic number of G and the least k for which
γDk can be refuted in F
D
± × G. Simply put, it says that if one of these numbers is big, then the other is
big as well.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that |WD± | = b and that G = (V,E). Then
(C1) If G cannot be painted in 2bk colours, then for all k-generated valuations θ and for all m we have
FD± ×G, θ |= γDm. In particular, FD± ×G |= γDk .
(C2) If G can be painted in N colours, then FD± ×G 6|= γDN(b−1)+1.
Proof. (C1) Condition (C-vi) of Lemma 4.1 and the soundness part of Theorem 3.3 guarantee that
FD± × G, x |= γDm for all x ∈ WD,G different from w0. We show that FD± × G, θ, w0 |= γDm as well,
if θ is k-generated. Since a formula γDm is invariant under transpositions of variables that swap pi
and pj , without any loss of generality we may assume that θ(pi) = ∅ for i > k. Define the map
τ : V → (P({1, . . . , k}))(b−1) by putting τ(v) for v ∈ V to be the map from WD± \ {w0} to P({1, . . . , k})
defined by
i ∈ τ(v)(y) iff (y, v) ∈ θ(pi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Since G cannot be painted in 2bk colours, there exist v1, v2 ∈ V such that {v1, v2} ∈ E and τ(v1) = τ(v2).
Consider the Kripke frame (FD± ×G)† = ((WD,G)†, (RD,Gλ )†, w0), where (WD,G)† = WD,G ∪WD± (recall
that WD± ∩WD,G = {w0}) and (RD,Gλ )† = RD,Gλ ∪ (RD+)λ. Then we set
θ†(pi) = θ(pi) ∪ {y ∈WD± | (y, v1) ∈ θ(pi)}
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We claim that ((FD± × G)†, θ†), w0 and (FD± × G, θ), w0 are bisimilar. Indeed, the
relation Z = {(z, z) | z ∈ WD,G} ∪ {(y, (y, v1)) | y ∈ WD± \ {w0}} ∪ {(y, (y, v2)) | y ∈ WD± \ {w0}}
constitutes a bisimulation. Since (FD± × G)†, θ†, w0 |= γDm (Theorem 3.3, Soundness), we conclude that
also FD± ×G, θ, w0 |= γDm.
(C2) Let τ : V → {1, . . . , N} be a colouring of G. Suppose that the variables of γDN(b−1)+1 are indexed
as p0 and p
c
i where 1 ≤ i ≤ b− 1, 1 ≤ c ≤ N . Consider the following valuation θ on FD± ×G:
θ(p) =
{
{x0}, if p = p0,
{(xi, v) | τ(v) = c}, if p = pci .
The definition of θ gives rise to the map θ∗ : FD± × G → {0, 1, . . . , N(b − 1)} defined by equations
θ∗(w0) = 0; θ∗((y, v)) = the number of p
τ(v)
i among {1, . . . , N(b− 1)}.
Recall that there is a natural projection pr : FD± ×G→ FD+ , defined by
pr(w0) = w0;
pr(xi, v) = xi for all v ∈ V.
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D
z1, z2, . . . , zs
T˜ F
D
± ×G
FD+
y1, y2, . . . , ys
{0, 1, . . . , N(b− 1)}
a
h
fT pr
θ∗
b
Figure 7:
Besides pr, there is a projection f T˜ : T˜→ D. We say that a map b :W T˜ → {0, 1, . . . , N(b−1)} respects
f T˜ if for all x, y ∈W T˜, f T˜(x) = f T˜(y) implies b(x) = b(y).
To prove that FD± ×G, θ 6|= γDN(b−1)+1 it is sufficient to prove that there is no homomorphism a : T˜→
FD± ×G, such that θ∗(a(t)) : T˜→ {0, 1, . . . , N(b− 1)} respects f T˜.
For the sake of contradiction, assume that such a exists. Consider the following map h : WD →WD± .
To define h(x) for x ∈ WD, we take any t ∈ (f T˜)−1(x) and set h(x) = pr(a(t)) (see Figure 7). It is
clear that h is well defined, i.e., it does not depend on the choice of t, since if t1, t2 ∈ (f T˜)−1(x), then
f T˜(t1) = f
T˜(t2), and this means that pr(a(t1)) = pr(a(t2)) due to the definition of θ. Clearly, h is a
homomorphism from D to FD+ , and it makes the diagram in Figure 7 commutative. Now we apply (C-v)
of Lemma 4.1 and conclude that the image of h is {g(x0), g(x1), . . . , g(xn)}.
Then we apply (C-iv). Let y1Rλ1y2 . . . Rλn−1ys, where yi ∈ WD± for 1 ≤ i ≤ s and λi ∈ Λ± for
1 ≤ i < s, be the path connecting xd with xd′ in FD− (in particular, y1 = xd and ys = xd′). Let
z1, . . . , zs ∈ WD be the points such that h(zi) = yi for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. By (C-v), (IV), D |= ziRλizi+1 for
1 ≤ i < s. The map f T˜ satisfies the following condition: if D |= w1Rλw2 for some w1, w2 ∈ WD, then
there exist points w′1, w
′
2 ∈ W T˜ such that T˜ |= w′1Rλw′2 and w′i ∈ (f T˜)−1(wi) for i ∈ {1, 2}. We apply
this statement s− 1 times for zi, Rλi and zi+1, and conclude that there exist points ti ∈ (f T˜)−1(zi) and
t′j ∈ (f T˜)−1(zj) for 1 ≤ i < s and 1 < j ≤ s such that T˜ |= tiRλit′i+1 for 1 ≤ i < s. Note that by the
definition of ti and t
′
i we have pr(a(ti)) = pr(a(t
′
i)) = yi.
Thus, let vi ∈ V and v′j ∈ V for 1 ≤ i < s and 1 < j ≤ s be such that a(ti) = (yi, vi) and
a(t′j) = (yi, v
′
j). Let us show that
(a) if 1 ≤ i < s then τ(vi) = τ(v′i+1) and
(b) if 1 < i < s then τ(vi) = τ(v
′
i).
(a): Since T˜ |= tiRλiti+1, due to the definition of RD,G and the facts that (f T˜(ti), f T˜(ti+1)) ∈ (RD−)λi
and (g(xd), g(xd′)) /∈ (RD−)λd , it follows that vi = v′i+1, and so τ(vi) = τ(v′i+1).
(b): From ti, t
′
i ∈ (f T˜)−1(zi) and the fact that θ(a(t)) respects f T˜, it follows that θ∗(a(ti)) = θ∗(a(t′i)).
Therefore θ∗((yi, vi)) = θ∗((yi, v′i)), and so τ(vi) = τ(v
′
i).
Together, (a) and (b) give us that τ(v1) = τ(v
′
s). Since F
D
+ |= g(xd)Rλdg(x′d), (C-v) implies that
D |= z1Rλdzs, and so there exist t′1 ∈ (f T˜)−1(z1) and ts ∈ (f T˜)−1(zs) such that T˜ |= t′1Rλdts. Let v′1 and
vs be such that a(t
′
1) = (y1, v
′
1) and a(ts) = (ys, vs). Arguing like in (b), one can show that τ(vs) = τ(v
′
s)
and that τ(v1) = τ(v
′
1). But T˜ |= t′1Rλdts together with the facts that a is a homomorphism and that τ
is a colouring of G imply that τ(v1) 6= τ(v′s) (recall that y1 = xd and ys = x′d), a contradiction.
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6 Pseudoproducts with complete graphs
Fix a diagram D. For an ordinal α let Kα denote the complete graph with α vertices.
Lemma 6.1. For any α FD± ×Kα 6|= eD(w0).
Proof. For finite α this is a consequence of Lemma 5.1, (C2) and the fact that F |= eD(x) implies F |= γDi
for all i ∈ ω and every Kripke frame F (Theorem 3.3, Soundness). Then notice that if FD±×Kα |= eD(w0)
for infinite α, then FD± ×Kα′ |= eD(w0) for some finite α′, because of the form of eD(x0).
For a point z ∈WD,Kα let piz denote the pricipal ultrafilter corresponding to the point z.
Lemma 6.2. (FD± ×Kα)u.e. |= eD(piw0) for every infinite α.
Proof. Suppose that WD± = {w0, w1, . . . , wb−1}, . We put W0 = {w0}, and Wi = {wi} × α. Let
h : WD,Kα \ {w0} → α be the projection given by the formula h((w, v)) = v.
First, we prove that (FD± ×Kα)u.e. |= eD(w0). To this end we fix an arbitrary non-principal ultrafilter
u over α, put Xi = {g(xi)} × α (thus every Xi = Wj for some j) and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n define ultrafilters µi
by the following condition
A ∈ µi ⇐⇒ h(A ∩Xi) ∈ u.
Also, put µ0 = piw0 . It is easy to check that xiR
D
λ xj implies µi(R
D,Kα)u.e.λ µj , and so
(FD± ×Kα)u.e. |= kD(µ0, µ1, . . . , µn) (for details, see Section 5 of [20]).
Now let us show that for arbitrary ultrafilter v, such that {w0} /∈ v (FD± ×Kα)u.e. |= eD(v). Notice
that WD,Kα = {w0} ∪W1 ∪ . . . ∪Wm. Hence, by Lemma 2.3 for some s Ws ∈ v. Let u be the ultrafilter
on α defined by condition
A ∈ u⇐⇒ h(A ∩Ws) ∈ u.
But, according to (C-vi), there exist wk1 , . . . , wkn such that F
D
+ |= kD(p(ws), wk1 , . . . , wkn). Now, define
ultrafilters µi for i = 1, . . . , n by the condition
A ∈ µi ⇐⇒ h(A ∩Wki) ∈ u.
We claim that (FD± ×Kα)u.e. |= kD(v, µ1, . . . , µn). Thus (FD± ×Kα)u.e. |= ∀x(x 6= w0 → eD(x)), and so
(FD± ×Kα)u.e. |= eD(w0).
Lemma 6.3. Let u be an ultrafilter over ω. Then
∏u
i∈ω(F
D
± ×Ki) is isomorphic to FD± ×
∏u
i∈ωKi.
Proof. Let dz0, v0, z1, v1, z2, v2, . . . e = dz¯, v¯e be a point of
∏u
i∈ω(F
D
±×Ki). Set Wj = {i ∈ ω | zi = wj} for
j = 0, . . . ,m. By Lemma 2.3, there exists unique j such that Wj ∈ u. Suppose, Wj = {i0, i1, i2, . . . }. We
put f(dz0, v0, z1, v1, z2, v2, . . . e) = (wj , dxi0 , xi1 , xi2 , . . . e). We claim that f is an isomorphism between∏u
i∈ω(F
D
± ×Ki) and FD± ×
∏u
i∈ωKi.
7 Erdo¨s graphs, or putting it all together
In this section we finally prove the following theorem, the strongest result of this paper.
Theorem 7.1. Let D be a minimal connected diagram with inner cycle and let
L = Log(∀x0eD(x0)). Then any axiomatisation of L requires infinitely many non-canonical formulas.
In order to do it, we use the following theorem by I. Hodkinson and Y. Venema. Its proof uses
probabilistic graphs of Paul Erdo¨s, and we do not reproduce it.
Theorem 7.2 (Theorem 2.3 from [15]). Let s ≥ 2. There are finite graphs H0, H1, . . . and surjective
homomorphisms ρi : Hi+1 → Hi for i < ω such that for each i,
(E1) for each edge {x, y} of Hi and each x′ ∈ ρ−1i (x), there is y′ ∈ ρ−1i (y) such that {x′, y′} is an edge
of Hi+1,
(E2) Hi has no odd cycles of length ≤ i,
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(E3) χ(Hi) = s (χ is the chromatic number).
Relying upon this theorem we show that the condition of Lemma 2.7 indeed holds for axiomati-
sation γDi of the logic in question. Recall that b is the number of points in F
D
± , and that W
D
± =
{w0, w1, . . . , wb−1}.
Given l, we announce n = (2bl+1) · (b−1)+1. Then, given k, we apply Theorem 7.2 with s = 2bk+1,
and get a sequence of graphs Hi and surjective homomorphisms ρi : Hi+1 → Hi. Now, we define the
sequence Gi to be the disjoint union of Hi and K2bl+1 (here Km is the full graph on m vertices), and
extend ρi to Gi+1 by putting it identical on K2bl+1. Finally, we set Fi = F
D
± ×Gi, and define morphisms
fi : Fi+1 → Fi by fi(w0) = w0 and fi((wj , v)) = (wj , ρi(v)) for j ≥ 1. (E1) guarantees that all fi are
indeed p-morphisms. It is easy to see that
lim←(FD± ×Gi) = FD± × lim←Gi and (VI)
lim←(Gi) = (lim←Hi) ∪K2bl+1. (VII)
Now we have apply Lemma 5.1 to ensure that (L1), (L2), (L3) hold for formulas γDi .
(L1): By (E3), Hi has chromatic number 2
bk + 1, and so it cannot be painted in 2bk colours. Since
Hi is a subgraph of Gi, Gi also cannot be painted in 2
bk colours. Thus, by (C1), Fi |= γDk .
(L2): By (VII), K2bl+1 is a subgraph of lim←Gi, and so lim←Gi cannot be coloured in 2bl colours.
Again, by (VI) and (C1), lim←Fi |= γDl .
(L3): By (E2), lim←Hi is two colourable. Hence lim←(Gi) can be coloured in 2bl+1 colours, therefore,
by (C2), lim←Fi 6|= γDn for n = (2bl + 1) · (b− 1) + 1. This finishes the proof of Theorem 7.1.
8 Main results
Theorem 8.1. Let D be a rooted diagram, all undirected cycles of which pass through its root. Then
(I-i) – (I-x) hold.
Proof. It is enough to establish that eD(x0) is locally modally definable by a generalised Sahlqvist for-
mula, and then use the generalised Sahlqvist theorem [12] on completeness. A rigourous proof of modal
definability of eD(x0) by a generalised Sahlqvist formula can be found in [20], Theorem 4.3. Since the
proof is quite long, we do not reproduce it here. A shorter proof of modal definability of eD(x0) was
given earlier in [31].
Theorem 8.2. Let D be a minimal rooted diagram with a cycle not passing through its root. Then
(I-i) – (I-ix) do not hold for the formula e(x0) = e
D(x0) and C, the class of all Kripke frames validating
∀x0e(x0).
(I-i) – (I-iii): Since local modal definability implies global definability, it is enough to show that
∀x0e(x0) is not globally modally definable. Indeed, FD±×Kω 6|= ∀x0e(x0) (Lemma 6.1) but (FD±×Kω)u.e. |=
∀x0e(x0) (Lemma 6.2), a contradiction to Lemma 2.2.
(I-iv), (I-v), (I-vii), (I-viii): follow immediately from Theorem 7.1.
(I-vi): As it is known (e.g. from [23], but the idea dates back to [26]), to prove that a normal modal
logic L is not axiomatisable with finitely many variables, it is sufficient to construct a sequence of Kripke
frames F1,F2,F3, . . . , such that
(a) Fi 6|= L for all i.
(b) for all k there exists n such that (Fn, θ) |= L for every k-generated valuation θ on Fn.
And this can be easily done: take Fi = F
D
± ×Ki for all i ∈ ω. Then (a) follows from Lemma 5.1, (C2)
and (b) follows from Lemma 5.1, (C1), and the fact that Kn cannot be painted in less then n colours
(take n = 2bk + 1).
(I-ix): it is clear that FD± ×Kω /∈ C (Lemma 6.1), but FD± ×Kω |= L (Lemma 5.1, (C1)).
(I-x): suppose that there exists a first-order formula γ such that F |= γ iff F |= L for each Kripke
frame F. Then by Lemma 5.1, (C2) for all i < ω FD± ×Ki |= ¬γ, but by Lemma 6.3,
∏u
i∈ω(F
D
± ×Ki) =
FD± × (
∏u
i∈ωKi), therefore
∏u
i∈ω(F
D
± ×Ki) |= γ, since
∏u
i∈ωKi is isomorphic to Kα for some infinite α
(cf. the proof of Theorem 10 of [16]). This contradicts Proposition 2.4.
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9 Discussion
Let us discuss the family of Kripke frame classes that are covered by our theorem. They are defined by
first-order formulas of the form ∀x0∃x1 . . . ∃xn
∧
xiRλxj . This family is chosen because it is large enough
to generate modal logics of both types of the dichotomy, and narrow enough to allow the dichotomy to
be proven. How interesting is this family? On the one hand, these formulas may seem rather artificial,
since very few of them may be said to be orthodox in modal logic, though they include well known
reflexivity and reflexive-successor conditions. It also seems difficult to invent a practical reasoning problem
involving these formulas. On the other hand, if we omit the universal quantifier ∀x0, then we obtain
existential conjunctive formulas, which recently have received much attention both in the logical and
computer science communities under the name of conjunctive queries. If we close the class of existential
conjunctive formulas with many free variables under restricted universal quantification, we obtain the
class of ∀∃-formulas discussed in Section 6 of [20], which includes many more first-order conditions
traditional to modal logic. Thus the formulas from this paper may be understood as ‘building blocks’
for more complicated and interesting formulas, and so our result can be considered as a step towards
more general dichotomy theorems. First-order formulas of the form a(x) = ∃y(xRλy ∧ b(y)) where b(y)
is a generalised Kracht formula may be good candidates for further research; see [1] and [11] for known
information about the corresponding modal logics. However, it is still not clear how far this dichotomy
can be pushed. It is also interesting if the condition
(I-xi) {F | F |= Log(C)} is ∆-elementary
may be added to (I-i) – (I-x) without breaking the dichotomy (cf. [2]).
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